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Introduction: Meaningful agreement 
on institutions in sight  
The election of a new French president could bring an 
end to the institutional deadlock in the EU – provided 
that the German EU presidency is able to strike a deal 
that can embrace the divergent demands of the 
member states. While the prevailing mood in Brussels 
policy circles is one of scepticism, finding a 
meaningful agreement should not prove impossible if 
negotiators can concentrate on substance and aim for 
a true middle ground. In the end, all must feel that 
their ‘red lines’ have not been trespassed, and yet 
there has to be real improvement in the functioning of 
the EU institutions and their democratic 
accountability. 
It should be possible to obtain an agreement if two 
sets of conditions are satisfied: 
a) A select number of key member states – especially 
France, the Netherlands and the UK – have demanded 
some important changes that they have identified as 
major obstacles to ratification. In response to these 
demands, all symbols of a constitution would have to 
be dropped and – speaking in legal terms – whatever 
changes are agreed to will have to amend existing 
treaties. Moreover, the text of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights cannot be incorporated into the 
treaties, as this would be unacceptable in the UK. The 
essence can be saved, however, with an appropriate 
reference in the revised treaties that makes the Charter 
binding upon the European institutions. 
b) On the other hand, the demands of the 20 countries 
that support the current Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe (CT) also have to be satisfied. 
The main provisions of the CT’s Part I will have to be  
 
retained as part of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU). Moreover, the changes in common policies that 
were agreed at the last intergovernmental conference 
(IGC) and included in Part III of the CT can be retained 
as a protocol amending the Treaty establishing the 
European Community (TEC). 
The result would be an important reinforcement of the 
existing ‘two-treaty-structure’. The revised TEU would 
contain all the main provisions on the EU institutions, 
while the revised TEC would contain the common 
policies and details on the functioning of the institutions 
in specific cases. The CT already contains provisions 
making it easier to change policies, i.e. essentially the 
Part III of the CT mentioned above, notably by not 
requiring an IGC and giving the Council the power to 
modify them by unanimity. If maintained in the TEU, 
this would over time consolidate the status of the TEU 
as the ‘fundamental law’ of the Union setting the 
common institutional framework and the rules of the 
game, whereas the TEC would determine specific 
common policies, e.g. how much market, how much 
solidarity, how much environmental protection, etc.  
We believe that the present conditions are auspicious 
for devising a possible solution to the current deadlock 
on the Constitutional Treaty. This Policy Brief provides 
an outline of such a solution. The paper is organised as 
follows: Section 1 presents the pre-conditions and the 
negotiating framework for the European Council in 
June and an ensuing IGC. Section 2 discusses the main 
substantive questions to be resolved and Section 3 casts 
a glance beyond the CT to other issues that sooner or 
later will have to be addressed. (A basic overview of 
the treaties involved is given in the box below.) 
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How many treaties does it take to make a Union? 
The  Treaty on European Union (TEU) referred to in this paper is essentially the Treaty of Maastricht in its 
consolidated form, including the amendments made by the Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice. It was signed on 7 
February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993. The treaty created the ‘European Union’ and established the 
current ‘three-pillar structure’ of the EU. In addition to the more integrated first pillar of the TEC (see below), it 
introduced two new ‘pillars’ of EU policy: the Common Foreign and Security Policy (the ‘second pillar’ in Title V) and 
Justice and Home Affairs (the ‘third pillar’ in Title VI). Both new pillars are primarily governed in an 
intergovernmental way with a reduced role in decision-making by the European Commission, European Parliament and 
Court of Justice. In 1999 the Treaty of Amsterdam brought several policy areas (visas, asylum and immigration) from 
the third to the ‘communitarised’ first pillar (i.e. from Title VI TEU to Title IV TEC), thus strengthening the role of the 
European institutional framework. In its Title I the TEU also includes general provisions on institutional matters (Arts 
3-5) and articles on the aims (Art. 2) and values (Art. 6) of the EU and as well as a sanction mechanism for member 
states that do not observe these basic values (Art. 7 ). In Title VII there are provisions for enhanced cooperation (Arts 
43-45). The ‘Final Provisions’ (Title VIII) contain important rules for future treaty revisions (Art. 48) and enlargements 
(Art. 49). 
The Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) goes back to one of the Treaties of Rome, the Treaty 
establishing a European Economic Community (TEEC), signed on 25 March 1957. The text referred to in the following 
is the consolidated version of this text after numerous treaty revisions, namely the substantial amendments (and name 
change to TEC) at Maastricht (see Title II, Art. 8 TEU). Since Maastricht the TEC represents the so-called ‘first pillar’ 
of the European treaty architecture: Procedures vary from one policy area to another (and often even within them), but 
essentially the TEC governs those policy areas that are ‘communitarised’ and where the different European institutions 
have been assigned an important role. It contains detailed provisions on the Community institutions, decision-making 
procedures and financial provisions (Arts 189-280 TEC) for the European Community. Since Maastricht the treaty also 
includes a part on Union citizenship (Arts 17-22) and European Monetary Union (Arts 98-124). In contrast to the 
European Union, the European Community has an explicit legal personality (Art. 281). 
The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CT) would repeal and replace the existing treaties (Art. I-437 
CT) which would greatly simplify the current coppice of treaties and amendments. The CT is largely based on a draft 
presented by the Convention on the Future of Europe, chaired by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing. In a subsequent IGC, 
member states made only minor revisions to the Convention’s text before signing it in Rome on 29 October 2004. The 
text has so far been ratified by 18 member states, but was rejected by popular referendum in France (29 May 2005) and 
the Netherlands (1 June 2005). The CT’s Part I mostly regroups provisions on the EU’s objectives, values, 
competences, finances and general institutional matters. Part II is an exact reproduction of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights thereby formalising its legal force (already recognised by the Court of Justice in various decisions). Part III 
contains the provisions on specific policies and detailed institutional matters. Part IV provides – among others – 
provisions for future treaty revisions. 
 
1.  Setting the stage for serious 
negotiations 
The time frame and the action plan for the new round 
of negotiations are de facto already decided, since it is 
agreed that treaty amendments should have legal force 
by spring 2009, in good time for the next European 
elections. Accordingly, the European Council will 
meet in Brussels on June 21 and 22 to find a 
compromise on the ‘key elements’ of a revised treaty. 
On this basis, it should then convene an IGC with a 
‘clear mandate’, which should complete its 
proceedings by the end of this year; and the ensuing 
year-and-a-half should allow sufficient time for the 
member states to complete ratification.
1 
While waiting for the results of the French presidential 
election, the German presidency of the Council 
                                                 
1 See the Draft Report “on the roadmap for the Union’s 
Constitutional Process” by the Constitutional Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament (2007/0000(INI) 
provisional, April 2007, Rapporteurs E. Barón Crespo and E. 
Brok, paragraph 10. 
circulated a questionnaire that provided a basis for 
bilateral consultations between the presidency and 
each of the member states.
2 The questionnaire has been 
accused of pre-empting the debate, but it does offer a 
comprehensive list of the questions that must be sorted 
out by the Council. The bilateral meetings, which took 
place between the end of April and the beginning of 
May, have provided the presidency with a clear picture 
of the ‘red lines’ beyond which each member state is 
not prepared to cross in search of a compromise. 
The member states have been asked in the first 
instance to indicate whether they are ready to retain the 
‘balance’ of the provisions in Part I of the CT, or 
whether they would rather discuss piecemeal 
amendments to existing treaties; and whether other 
policies should be brought into the discussion to 
facilitate agreement, e.g. energy, the environment, 
economic and social policies. Obviously, re-proposing 
the entire text of the CT has already been ruled out. 
                                                 
2 The questionnaire was published by Agence Europe on 28 
April 2007. See the annex for an English version.  
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The hard nut to crack will be how much to retain of 
Part I and related provisions in Parts III and IV. 
Other questions refer more or less explicitly to the 
legal nature of the new treaty: should ‘names and 
symbols’ typical of a constitution be dropped? More 
fundamentally, are certain provisions, such as those on 
the single legal personality of the Union or the primacy 
of Community law, of a constitutional nature and 
therefore also to be dropped? And, finally, what will 
be the fate of the Charter on Fundamental Rights? Is it 
conceivable to offer opt-out clauses to member states 
that are not ready to adhere to new policies introduced 
by the CT? Should the new treaty include the 
Copenhagen criteria for admission of new members
3 – 
clearly a provision designed to assuage fears of further 
enlargement of the Union? 
While the individual answers from countries are not 
known, it has become clear that any solution will have 
to respect a fundamental constraint: whatever new 
treaty emerges from the negotiations, the French, 
Dutch and British governments demand it to be of such 
nature that it will not require them to hold a new 
referendum. They openly advocate dropping the name 
Constitutional Treaty and all references to a 
constitution, thus making the new treaty look as 
‘technical’ as possible.  
In France, this condition also entails leaving 
unchanged the status of the TEC, thus eliminating the 
possibility that the market economy principles would 
assume an enhanced force of fundamental law. 
Sarkozy’s public stance on the admission of Turkey 
should suffice to reassure his constituency on the risks 
of further enlargement without further ado. The 
situation is even trickier in the United Kingdom, since 
the government insists that provisions suggesting the 
transfer of sovereign powers to the Union would not be 
acceptable. The problem is compounded by the 
imminent change in the premiership: what was not 
seen as a threat to sovereign powers under Blair, when 
the CT was signed, might now be viewed differently 
under Gordon Brown. 
In its opposition to meaningful institutional change, 
the United Kingdom will be able to enlist the support 
of Poland and the Czech Republic, certainly as regards 
opposition to constitutional symbols in the new treaty. 
However, Poland’s main interest is to prevent the 
double majority voting system in the Council as it is 
                                                 
3 The June 1993 European Council in Copenhagen 
established three main criteria that a country must meet to 
join the European Union: political (stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities); economic 
(existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity 
to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within 
the Union); and acceptance of the Community acquis 
(ability to take on the obligations of membership, including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union).  
outlined in the CT, to preserve at least some of the 
disproportionate weight relative to its population that it 
currently enjoys under the rules agreed during the Nice 
IGC. Neither the Czech Republic nor the United 
Kingdom is likely to go to the mat on this issue, since 
on balance the new system does not damage them. 
And Spain, once a stubborn opponent of the double 
majority system provided for by the CT, has now 
joined the camp of countries resolutely in favour of 
approving the CT as it is. In the end, the issue might 
boil down to finding adequate compensation for 
Poland in other domains. 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not likely to 
represent a stumbling block. Its inclusion in the new 
treaty is not on the cards, given determined opposition 
by the UK, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and 
Poland, and a fairly reticent attitude among the Nordic 
members of the Union. However, other alternatives 
have been envisaged: it could either be incorporated 
through an annex or, more likely, be recalled through a 
reference within the new treaty clearly stating its legal 
value, e.g. as done in the present Article 6 of the TEU 
for the European Convention for the protection of 
human rights. Since the European Court of Justice 
already refers to the Charter in its judgements as a 
source of individual rights, a case can be made that no 
new rights would be created in this manner. 
Of course, stripping the treaty of all of its 
constitutional symbolism might come at a price, to the 
extent that it will weaken the legitimacy of the Union 
in the minds of its citizens. If political leaders think 
that a constitution is not the appropriate means to 
foster a common sense of solidarity among European 
citizens, they will have to propose other alternatives: 
past experience seems to show that a ‘Europe of 
results’ alone is not sufficient to endow the Union with 
greater legitimacy. Perhaps for this reason, Sarkozy 
has suggested that further reform might have to be 
considered after 2009, following broad public 
consultations and, possibly, even a new Convention. 
On the other hand, any deal must pay due recognition 
to the fact that 18 member states have ratified the CT, 
in a number of cases with referenda showing strong 
popular support, and two other countries – Portugal 
and Ireland – have declared themselves “friends of the 
Constitution”.
4 These 20 governments insist that the 
‘essence’ of the current text must be preserved and 
that, accordingly, any renegotiation should take the 
current CT as a point of departure and preserve as 
                                                 
4 The countries that have ratified are: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Spain. Strictly legally speaking, Germany has 
not ratified the Constitutional Treaty despite high majorities 
in favour in both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. Federal 
president Horst Köhler has not signed the ratification act yet, 
after the Federal Constitutional Court accepted to rule on a 
complaint by a member of parliament. The ruling has still 
not taken place.  
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much as possible the existing ‘balance’. The European 
Parliament – which this time is demanding full 
participation in the IGC – is likely to take a similar 
stand.
5 
The assignment for the negotiations is thus clear: the 
bulk of provisions in Part I must be saved, as any other 
solution would inevitably unravel the delicate 
balancing of the interests of the member states – big 
and small, federalists and intergovernmental, 
advocates of free markets and of the social market 
economy – that made agreement possible in the last 
IGC. For example, most of the smaller member states 
only accepted a permanent Council president because 
the position of the Commission president was 
strengthened as well. 
Therefore, the ‘Treaty of Nice-plus’ option – cherry-
picking selective provisions from Part I on the 
functioning of the EU institutions – does not offer a 
viable basis for compromise. It simply departs too 
much from the expectations of the member states 
ready to implement the CT. The alternative to retaining 
the balance and main institutional reforms of Part I 
(with minor additions and subtractions to be 
negotiated) would likely be deadlock and crisis – a 
scenario that neither the German nor the French 
leadership, to start with, is ready to consider. 
In this crisis scenario, the Council would have to 
devote its efforts to the minimal task of reducing the 
number of Commissioners and deciding on equal 
rotation criteria, since under the Nice Treaty their 
number will have to be lower than the number of 
member states after 2009.
6 However, without a 
balanced package of measures, the bitter divisions that 
plagued the last phase of the Nice negotiations are 
bound to reappear. Eventually, the majority of 
members that want a stronger Union may well decide 
to proceed without the permission of those that do not 
want to proceed. The new prime minister in the United 
Kingdom will no doubt carefully consider and weigh 
all the implications of this scenario. 
A last question on the structure of the negotiations that 
needs to be addressed concerns the possible role of the 
common policies – in such fields as energy, the 
environment, or economic and social policies. Those 
favouring their inclusion into the negotiations argue 
that many of those who voted ‘no’ in the French and 
Dutch referenda were really asking for ‘more Europe, 
not less’, and accordingly argue that strengthened 
common policies should be part of the deal.
7 
Eurobarometer surveys show strong demand amongst 
the public for more effective action by the Union in 
                                                 
5 See the EP Constitutional Affairs Committee draft report 
quoted in footnote 1. 
6 Under Article 4 of the Protocol “On the enlargement of the 
European Union”. On this, see Section 4 below. 
7 See, for instance A. Duff, “Plan B: Comment Sauver la 
Constitution Européenne”, Notre Europe, Etudes et 
Recherches n. 52, November 2006. 
these domains. The difficulty with this proposition is 
that there is no agreement on what precisely the new 
common action should be. The Council has been 
unable to agree on a common policy to deal with 
Russia with one voice on energy supply: would it be 
any easier to write new legal bases for common action 
in these domains in the treaty? Or, to make another 
example: is the European Council more likely to agree 
on common economic and fiscal policies to be written 
in the treaties at their meeting in June than it has been 
during the past decade, and on what basis? In sum, is it 
realistic to think that very difficult negotiations can be 
made easier by introducing other controversial issues 
to the agenda? We believe not: the European Council 
ought to stick to its core business of finding a good 
agreement on institutional issues. 
2.  Elements of a feasible deal on 
institutions 
If it can agree to circumscribe its negotiations as has 
been suggested, the European Council would confront 
a number of difficult, but manageable issues. Reaching 
an agreement would not be inconceivable. 
First of all, the Council will have to decide how to 
proceed in amending the treaties. One possibility 
would be to amend the TEU in such a way that it 
would de facto be replaced with the revised Part I of 
the CT. However, the German presidency seems 
inclined to revert to the traditional method of treaty 
amendments decided one by one, so as to stress 
continuity between the old and the new. In both cases, 
the TEC would retain its present status and continue to 
stand as a separate treaty. The difference would lie in 
the degree of complexity of the future treaty structure. 
If the TEU becomes a slightly revised Part I of the 
current CT,
8 there would be a clear division in 
function: 
•  the TEU would then regroup all general 
institutional provisions and ‘fundamental’ norms, 
whereas 
•  the TEC would contain specific policies and more 
detailed provisions on the institutions (broadly 
corresponding to Part III of the CT).  
If however the new treaty was to simply amend the 
existing TEU and TEC article by article (like the 
Treaty of Amsterdam or the Treaty of Nice), the two 
dimensions of institutions and policies would remain 
blurred while the amending treaty itself would only be 
comprehensible to experts.  
It is therefore also necessary to decide what to do with 
the many amendments to the TEC that have been 
agreed and signed up to by all the member states, and 
that would not be retained as strict complements of 
provisions from Part I. Were the TEU to be substituted 
                                                 
8 Including a very limited number of provisions from Part III 
and IV of the CT that deal with general institutional matters.  
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in full by the revised Part I ,  t h e n  –  a s  h a s  b e e n  
suggested by jurists of the European University 
Institute in Florence – all amendments to the TEC 
could be included in a separate Protocol and be ratified 
together with the new TEU. Otherwise, the 
amendments to the TEC can be listed in the amending 
treaty one by one. What is no longer on the cards is the 
complete repeal of existing treaties and their 
substitution with an entirely new treaty.
9 
Turning to the substance of Part I, the first step of the 
European Council will in all likelihood be the removal 
of all provisions smacking of a constitution, as has 
been explained. The identification of such provisions 
is likely to prove controversial and a fine line will have 
to be drawn through the text. The easy part is ‘symbols 
and names’: accordingly, the Preamble and Articles I-
1, I-2 and I-8 in Title I are likely to go and the word 
‘constitution’ will then be surgically removed from all 
remaining provisions. 
A specific issue arising in this context concerns the 
title of ‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ attributed to the 
figure responsible at the same time for implementing 
the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and 
coordinating the Commission’s external activities. As 
a number of leaders are clearly opposed to using state-
like symbolism, they are likely to look for another 
name. The post should of course continue to reflect the 
fact that this figure will be accountable both to the 
Council and, as a member of the Commission, to its 
president and the European Parliament. 
The CT also envisaged new titles and, more 
importantly, a well-defined hierarchy of norms for 
legislative and regulatory acts of the Union. While 
some argue that these provisions are of a constitutional 
nature, the main goal of the provisions is to remove the 
inconsistencies in the legal instruments in the treaties 
that have been a major source of confusion in Union 
legislation. Indeed, these provisions were drafted in 
response to the Laeken questions about simplification, 
democratisation and transparency,
10 and they are thus 
not a direct consequence of the constitutional project. 
It may be recalled, in this regard, that at present the 
Union has 15 different legal instruments; some of 
them, while carrying different names, have similar 
effects.
11 Furthermore, some Council decisions on 
                                                 
9 Some Council members are likely to try to go back on 
certain ‘innovations’ contained in Part III, notably regarding 
extensions of qualified majority voting as well as changes in 
legal bases in Judicial and Police Cooperation. On this, the 
Council might want to consider granting e.g. the United 
Kingdom, an opt-out in these domains, as national vetoes are 
removed by the new treaty. 
10 See the Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European 
Union, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of the Laeken 
European Council, 14 and 15 December 2001. 
11 On the problems arising from this duplicity of instruments, 
see the Final Report of Working Group IX on Simplification 
of the Convention (CONV 424/02 of 29 November 2002).  
individual cases have contradicted the principles 
established by directives, which is quite possible in a 
system where individual decisions are not bound by 
general legislation. Thus, these changes are essential to 
bring some order, consistency and clarity to EU 
legislative and administrative acts, including the 
delegation of powers to the Commission. Furthermore, 
the change in names – in particular the new distinction 
between framework laws (now directives, requiring 
transposition by the member states) and laws (now 
regulations, directly applicable in the member states) – 
was explicitly intended to improve the understanding 
of Union legal acts by citizens. 
The European Council should also confirm the single 
legal personality of the Union and the elimination of 
the pillar structure of the TEU.
12 These changes would 
strengthen the capacity of the Union to act and make 
its structure more understandable both to its citizens 
and its international partners. If the CT’s restricting 
provisions in Part I for foreign policy (Article I-40 
CT), defence policy (Article I-41 CT) and justice and 
home affairs (Article I-42 CT) are also introduced to 
the TEU, the effects on national sovereignty will be 
rather limited and of a formal nature while providing 
gains in transparency and efficiency. 
The fate of the provision confirming the primacy of 
Union law is uncertain. On the one hand, the European 
Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on this question is 
well established and has not been challenged by 
national constitutional courts; on the other hand, 
signing up to this principle in the amended treaty is 
likely to raise strong objections among those heads of 
state more sensitive on national sovereignty. 
Once all these questions are sorted out, the shape of a 
revised Part I of the CT will be settled. All other 
provisions should be retained – including the two 
Protocols on the role of national parliaments in the 
European Union and on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Also, a 
number of provisions in Part I of the CT would not 
stand by themselves, requiring the addition of 
complementary provisions that were placed in Part III; 
the straightforward solution to this problem is to insert 
them right away into the relevant articles of Part I. 
They notably concern the functioning of institutions, 
the flexibility clause formerly included in Article 308 
                                                 
12 With a single legal personality, the subject of international 
law would be the Union, with strong benefits of clarification 
and simplification in its external relations. Suppression of 
the pillar structure would require the insertion of a clause in 
the TEC stating the difference between the European 
Community and the Union.  
6 | Kurpas & Micossi 
of the TEC and the budgetary procedure.
13 Agreement 
on these provisions should not prove too difficult.
14 
Some provisions to be retained are also contained in 
Part IV of the CT. They notably concern the general 
‘passerelle’ for moving to qualified majority decisions 
and adopting the ordinary legislative procedure, 
instead of special procedures, in the Council; and the 
simplified revision procedure in Article IV-445. The 
latter is especially significant since it would eliminate 
the requirement of an IGC for amending Union 
policies currently contained in Title III of Part III of 
the CT (Internal Policies and Action). 
3.  Taking the longer view 
With a slimmed-down treaty as outlined above, the EU 
would become somewhat more efficient and 
democratic, but it is questionable whether it would 
really prepare the Union for the future. In this section, 
we take a critical look at some other institutional 
aspects that could build on the solution outlined above.  
3.1  Super-qualified-majority for future 
treaty revisions 
The most important institutional improvement would 
be an easier revision procedure for those parts of the 
treaties that do not pertain to ‘fundamental law’.
15 The 
current need for unanimity should be replaced by a 
‘super-qualified majority’ to avoid complete deadlock 
on treaty reform in the future. Concretely, a revision 
mechanism as proposed by MEP Andrew Duff could 
be envisaged: 4/5 of member states representing 2/3 of 
the Union’s population.
16 The non-ratifying states 
would be bound by all decisions concerning policy 
areas of the current first pillar. They would however 
not be bound by decisions concerning pre-defined 
issues outside the first pillar that impinge on national 
sovereignty (e.g. on the current ‘third pillar’). In the 
latter case, they could then negotiate opt-outs. 
The potential implications of such a change for the 
future development of the Union are enormous. To 
mention the main one: once the distinction between 
‘fundamental law’ of the Union and the provisions 
relating to the policies has been established, this would 
                                                 
13 For a full description of these provisions, see G.L. Tosato 
and G. Bonvicini, “Una strategia italiana per il rilancio del 
Trattato Costituzionale Europeo”, IAI, Rome, April 2007, 
Annex 1 (prepared by N. Pirozzi).   
14 A complete analysis of these issues can be found in the 
“Feasiblity Study for a New Treaty and Supplementary 
Protocols to Take Over the Substance of the Constitutional 
Treaty”, prepared by Jacques Ziller and his colleagues at the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies of the 
European Institute in Florence, 23 April 2007. 
15 That is, the provisions that do not deal with fundamental 
institutional questions, division of competences, values or 
objectives of the EU. 
16 See Andrew Duff, “Constitution Plus – Renegotiating the 
Treaty”, TEPSA, Brussels, February 2007.  
open the way to the possibility of partisan divisions in 
decisions over policies, which however would not call 
into question the institutional framework, but would 
develop  within the institutional framework.
17 Thus, 
political parties across Europe could take different 
stances on specific Union policies, along the 
traditional left-right divisions typical of national 
politics, without calling into question the allegiance to 
common institutions. The possibility of European-wide 
debates on Union policies could revitalise the 
legitimacy of the Union and foster the creation of a 
European demos. 
3.2  Size of the Commission 
The solution presented in Part I of the CT for the size 
of the Commission is one of the points that the heads 
of state should reconsider in due time. It proposes that 
the college should consist of a number that 
corresponds to 2/3 of the number of member states and 
that all nationalities should rotate on an equal basis 
(Article I-26). An interesting alternative that would 
overcome the drawbacks of a mechanical rotational 
system was put forth by the new French president – at 
that time only presidential candidate – in an address to 
the Friends of Europe in September 2006. He proposed 
that the choice of commissioners should be left 
entirely to the discretion of the president of the 
Commission; in forming his Commission, the latter 
would no doubt take into account personalities as well 
as the need to achieve an appropriate geographical and 
political balance. Under the Sarkozy proposal, the 
president of the Commission would be elected by the 
European Parliament, as is also envisaged in the CT; 
the Parliament’s vote of confidence would of course 
also depend on the quality of the college proposed for 
approval. 
3.3  A constructive use of flexibility 
mechanisms 
As outlined in an earlier paper,
18 the enlarged 
European Union will increasingly depend on 
mechanisms for flexible integration. This holds true 
regardless of whether or not an agreement is reached in 
June. Flexible integration should therefore be seen as a 
complement and not as an alternative to finding 
agreement on institutional advances. It is important not 
to ‘abuse’ these mechanisms as threat scenarios for 
integration laggards, but to use them as a constructive 
tool to overcome tensions between countries that want 
to go ahead faster and those that prefer not to 
participate. The provisions in the current treaties have 
never been used, while preference was given to 
                                                 
17 On this, see Tosato and Bonvicini cited in footnote 12.  
18 Sebastian Kurpas, Julia De Clerck-Sachsse, José I. 
Torreblanca and Gaëtane Ricard-Nihoul, From Threat to 
Opportunity – Making Flexible Integration Work, EPIN 
Working Paper No. 15, September 2006 (downloadable at 
http://shop.ceps.eu).  
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initiatives outside the treaties that were later 
integrated. The simplification of conditions as 
proposed in the CT could make this option more 
attractive. However, initiatives taken outside the 
treaties are also acceptable as long as their integration 
into the treaties is foreseen for a later stage and the 
door remains open for any EU member state wanting 
to join. In this regard, the Treaty of Schengen has set a 
useful precedent that can hopefully be imitated.  
3.4  National parliaments: More than 
‘subsidiarity watchdogs’ 
The protocol to the CT on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality would 
establish a so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure (Article 7 
Paragraph 3 and 4 of the protocol). If at least one-third 
of national parliaments view a legislative initiative as 
infringing the principle of subsidiarity, this initiative 
would have to be reviewed, but it could still pass if a 
reasoned opinion is given. Currently there are some 
governments (especially the Dutch) that would even 
like to introduce a ‘red card’ procedure, which would 
give one-third of national parliaments the right to 
effectively stop a legislative initiative on grounds that 
subsidiarity had not been respected. While the yellow 
card system should be adopted – possibly as a protocol 
to the revised TEU (see above) – the red card 
procedure should not be considered, even in the longer 
term. We do not question the wisdom of scrutinising a 
legislative initiative to ascertain that it really makes 
sense at the European level and brings value added 
over national regulations. However, the attendant 
increase in veto players should be seen in the 
institutional context and should therefore be balanced 
by measures aimed at creating a more efficient EU. 
The red card procedure would effectively create a 
‘third chamber’ in European decision-making and 
would risk politicising the question of subsidiarity.  
National parliaments viewing their primary role as 
‘subsidiarity watchdogs’ would also limit their own 
potential as pro-active attendants of the EU policy 
process. They have a role to play in shaping the 
mandate for the negotiations in the Council of 
Ministers and there is a need to foster public debates 
on Commission initiatives at the time they are 
presented. At present, citizens often only become 
aware of an issue when EU legislation is finally 
implemented – sometimes years after it has been 
adopted. It is then easy for national politicians to 
blame ‘Brussels’, although they actually agreed to the 
measure in the Council of Ministers. This is clearly a 
problem of national constitutional arrangements, 
however, as some countries (e.g. Denmark) are far 
more advanced than others (e.g. Germany) and a one-
size-fits-all approach is likely to fail. At the European 
level, one could envisage best-practice mechanisms 
that put pressure on national governments to become 
more active. 
3.5  Foreign Minister and Foreign 
Service? 
One of the main institutional changes in the CT Part I 
is the ‘double-hatting’ of the Council’s High 
Representative and the Commissioner for External 
Relations as ‘Foreign Minister’ (or whatever else 
he/she might be called). This figure would be further 
enhanced if he/she were also to chair the Foreign 
Affairs Council. The holder of this office, if also a 
sufficiently talented individual, would be well placed 
to become a prominent personality on the world stage. 
The case can certainly be made that this would make 
the EU’s external policy more coherent and more 
efficient.  
Nevertheless, various problems involved with 
implementation of this reform seem not to have been 
seriously addressed, and they may turn out to be 
important enough to undermine its rationale. In 
particular, it is not clear how the relationship between 
the Foreign Minister, who would also be a vice-
president of the Commission, and other actors would 
develop concretely. In a worst-case scenario, his role 
might weaken the position of the Commission 
president and fuel turf-fights between its Directorate-
General for External Relations and other Directorates-
General with significant external policy functions 
(trade, development, energy, etc.). The Foreign 
Minister’s relationship with the rest of the college 
could also prove problematic. In case of conflict 
between the Council and his colleague-commissioners, 
whose line would he follow? 
Clarification would also be needed about the allocation 
of resources between the Council and the Commission, 
and whether the resources that currently reside mostly 
with the Commission (staff and budget) would remain 
there. If not, it would lead to a significant weakening 
of the Commission at the expense of the Council. In 
particular the institutional location of the proposed 
‘Foreign Service’ (or whatever this might be called) is 
not evident, as it could be in the Council, or in the 
Commission, or in neither entirely, but positioned 
somewhere special in between these two institutions.  
The Foreign Service’s operations abroad hardly need 
new constitutional foundations. The Commission’s 
delegations are already global in reach and only need 
strengthening on the political side, which could easily 
be achieved by the Council Secretariat deploying 
people into these missions. The choice of Heads of 
Delegation would be a management issue between the 
institutions, not a constitutional one.   
The demands on the time of the Foreign Minister is 
certainly going to be so high that he/she would need 
high-level political deputies equivalent to the ‘state 
secretaries’ found in most foreign ministries. Who 
would they be, and in which institution?  
With the solutions to these important institutional 
details not altogether evident or easy to design, it could 
be that the institutions will look back to the Solana- 
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Patten duo as having been a rather sound model: i.e. 
with two able individuals, sharing both the burden of 
external representation and a division of labour over 
types of competence. It has been observed that 
cooperation between senior officials of the Council 
and the Commission has progressed significantly in the 
CFSP/ESDP area since the demise of the Constitution. 
It appears that the referendum shock has pushed them 
into working together pragmatically.  
Among all the major functions of public policy, the 
conduct of foreign policy relies the least on legislation 
and the most on repeated games of interaction with 
third parties. The EU has already crafted its 
instruments of trade, aid and crisis management policy, 
all of which can be combined in agreements having the 
highest treaty standing. The EU is feeling its way 
gradually in increasing the diplomatic space entrusted 
to the EU institutions, alongside the decline of 
increasingly obsolete national diplomacy on most 
matters of importance. This gradual transfer of 
effective  competences  is  a  matter  of  the continuing 
learning experience of how to manage world affairs 
best, and the build-up of trust between the EU 
institutions and the member states. The development 
of the European political demos is of the essence at 
this point, rather than constitutional change. 
Conclusion 
This paper has provided an overview of the status of 
the debate over institutional reform. If the German 
presidency shows sufficient determination and 
dexterity, it can lay the foundations for a compromise 
that goes far beyond a lowest common denominator at 
the June Summit. Even if it does succeed, however, 
important issues will remain on the table: particularly 
the conditions for future treaty reforms, which are of 
central importance in order to avoid institutional 
inflexibility, and the lack of transparency in a Union of 
27 member states. Moreover, the more general 
question of how the Union can regain popular support 
will of course not have been convincingly answered. 
 
Annex. Questionnaire in View of the Bilateral Meetings with Focal Points 
to be held between 23 April and 4 May 
The bilateral consultations to be held between 23 April and 4 May represent an important stage in preparing the report the 
Presidency is mandated to submit to the June European Council. The Presidency wants to explore all avenues that would 
allow placing the EU on a renewed common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009. To this end, an IGC 
with a very precise and limited mandate would have to be opened as soon as possible after the June summit, its starting 
point being the substance of modifications to the Treaty of Nice as agreed upon in the Constitutional Treaty. In order to 
succeed, every effort will have to be made to restrict changes to what is absolutely necessary to reach an overall agreement 
and to ensure ratification by all member states. Bearing this in mind as well as the questions raised by partners in the 
consultations in the first half of the Presidency, the Presidency invites delegations to reflect on the following questions: 
1.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States not to repeal the existing treaties but to return to the 
classical method of treaty changes while preserving the single legal personality and overcoming the pillar structure of 
the EU? 
2.  How do you assess in that case the proposal made by some Member States that the consolidated approach of part I of 
the Constitutional Treaty is preserved, with the necessary presentational changes resulting from the return to the 
classical method of treaty changes? 
3.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States using a different terminology without changing the 
legal substance, for example with regard to the title of the treaty, the denomination of EU legal acts and the Union’s 
Minister for Foreign Affairs? 
4.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States not to include an article relating to the symbols of the 
EU? 
5.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States not to include an article that explicitly restates the 
primacy of EU law? 
6.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States that Member States will replace the full text of the 
Charter on Fundamental Rights by a short cross reference having the same legal value? 
7.  Do you agree that the institutional provisions of the Constitutional Treaty form a balanced package that should not be 
reopened? 
8.  Are there other elements which in your view constitute indispensable parts of the overall compromise reached at the 
time? 
9.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States concerning possible improvements/clarifications on 
issues related to new challenges facing the EU, for instance in the fields of energy/climate change or illegal 
immigration? 
10.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States to highlight the Copenhagen criteria in the article on 
enlargement? 
11.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States to address the social dimension of the EU in some way 
or the other? 
12.  How do you assess the proposal made by some Member States applying opt-in/out provisions to some of the new 
policy provisions set out in the Constitutional Treaty? 